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Abstract:
In 1977, Norway established a maritime Fisheries Protection Zone (FPZ) around Svalbard, yet 
avoided claiming an outright Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). A dispute with Russia over the 
status of the Zone arose. In the late 1990s, Norwegian enforcement of fisheries regulations became 
stricter, as fish stocks were in decline. This led the Norwegian Coast Guard to attempt to arrest 
Russian fishing vessels on several occasions, resulting in reactions from Russian fishermen, as well 
as officials in Murmansk and Moscow. In 1998, 2001, 2005, and 2011 specifically, incidents had 
the potential to escalate beyond a fisheries issue. Today, an event in the maritime zone is of concern 
to both Norwegian and Russian authorities. Given the potential volatility of events in the FPZ, 
how do Norway and Russia manage to avoid escalation in the case of a crisis? Whereas previous 
scholarly work has explicitly focused on the legal status of Svalbard and its maritime zones, or 
looked at how Norway manages fisheries in cooperation with Russia, this article brings forth new 
knowledge by examining the specific incidents in the Zone and placing these in the wider context 
of conflict theory. Limited to the Norwegian perceptions of the dispute only, this article adds to 
our understanding of this specific issue of Arctic conflict management and governance. Based on 
several years of data collection through interviews, the argument put forth is that Norwegian and 
Russian cooperation is based on both mutual interests and the socializing effects of cooperative 
mechanisms, which in turn are key to avoid escalation in crisis-scenarios. In sum, we need to 
recognise how a combination of economic interests and the effects of socialisation have enabled 
Norway and Russia to keep conflict levels low, when incidents at sea have occurred.
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1. Introduction
In 1977, Norway established a maritime Fisheries Protection Zone (FPZ) around 
the  archipelago of Svalbard, north of the Norwegian mainland. Norway avoided 
claiming an outright Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) fearing it would be chal-
lenged  by the global community due to stipulations (or lack thereof) concerning 
extended maritime zones in the Svalbard Treaty from 1920.1 Since then, Norway has 
 managed economic activity in this maritime domain, principally fisheries.2 At  the 
turn of the millennium, Norwegian fisheries enforcement became stricter, in tandem 
with declining fish stocks and fear of considerable IUU (illegal, unreported, and un-
regulated) fishing in the Barents Sea. The first example of this was the attempted ar-
rest of the Russian fishing vessel  Novokuybyshevsk in 1998. This led to reactions from 
Russian fishermen, as well as officials in both Murmansk and Moscow, which further 
peaked on later  occasions, when the Norwegian Coast Guard attempted to arrest the 
Russian fishing vessels Chernigov in 2001, Elektron in 2005, and Sapphire II in 2011. 
The risk of events spiralling out of control in the FPZ remains a primary concern for 
both the Norwegian Coast Guard and the Norwegian Ministry of Defence.3 Echoing 
these fears, in 2017 the Russian Defence Ministry deemed Svalbard a potential area 
for future conflict with Norway, and in consequence NATO.4
Carving oceans into zones of national ownership is a recent endeavour, solidi-
fied with the United Nations Law of the Sea Conventions (UNCLOS) in the 1970s 
and 80s. Today, marine resources are gaining attention, as the world continues to 
seek food, energy and rare earth minerals.5 With this attention, focus has also shifted 
to maritime disputes, many left unresolved due to limited popular and economic 
 interest when they arose decades ago.6 This article grapples with the overarching 
topic of conflict and dispute management between states at sea. By using one specific 
case of dispute management between Norway and Russia, we can attempt to better 
understand factors underpinning maritime conflict management.
Given the potential volatility of events in the FPZ, how have Norway and Russia 
managed to avoid escalation in the case of crisis? Asking why something has not 
 occurred – i.e. outright conflict in the FPZ – is inherently more difficult than asking 
why something has occurred.7 This question is worth asking, however, in order to 
improve our understanding of the complexities concerning this maritime dispute, 
which involves resource management in the context of larger security concerns. In 
turn, a study of this particular issue can enable us to better understand conflict man-
agement at sea.
This article is based on several years of data collection (2014-2017) through 
 interviews with Norwegian Coast Guard officials, officials at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Ministry of Defence in Norway, as well as former Norwegian Navy and 
Coast Guard officers. It also leans on previous scholarly work concerned with Rus-
sia, Norway, maritime disputes, and fisheries. Several scholars have grappled with 
these issues before – most notably Pedersen8, Hønneland9, Jørgensen10, Molenaar11, 
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Stokke12, Jensen13, and Anderson.14 Others have looked at specific incidents and/or 
agreements in the Barents Sea.15
Whereas previous scholarly work has explicitly focused on the legal status of Sval-
bard and its maritime zones, or looked at managing fisheries in cooperation with 
Russia, this article brings forth new knowledge by examining the specific incidents 
that have taken place in the FPZ and attempts to outline why they have been kept 
at a limited level. Also, by leaning on recently published material by former Norwe-
gian Coast Guard Chief Skram16, as well as in-depth interviews with several relevant 
actors in the Norwegian Military and Government17, it adds new empirical under-
standing to an issue of utmost relevance to Norwegian-Russian relations specifically, 
and Arctic governance generally.
The article omits, however, Russian perspectives on dispute management in the 
Svalbard Zone. Norway is the principal authority in the FPZ, and understanding 
decisions made and attitudes towards infringements by vessels from other countries 
by the Norwegian authorities is key to understanding why conflict has been kept at 
a limited level. This is what this article aims to do, while recognising that this is just 
one piece of the puzzle, albeit a crucial one. The purpose of this article is therefore 
not to offer a complete overview of all facts, views and details pertaining to the FPZ. 
Instead, it aims to discuss conflicts between states within the maritime domain in gen-
eral, using Norwegian approaches to incidents in this maritime zone as a specific case.
The next step would then to be to perform a similar study of Russian perceptions 
and attitudes towards dispute management and compare these with findings put 
forth here. Some scholars have already provided insights into general Russian Arctic 
development, investment and strategies.18 These would thus provide an initial start-
ing point for such an analysis, and are also of relevance to this study.
The argument put forth is that from a Norwegian perspective, Norwegian and Russian 
cooperation is based on both mutual interests and the socializing effects of cooperative 
mechanisms, which in turn are key to avoid escalation in crisis-scenarios. Yet, we cannot 
disregard the self-interest that underpins the formation of venues where actors from 
both states meet, which in turn can be subject to change. In sum, we need to recognise 
how a combination of economic interests and the effects of socialisation have enabled 
Norway and Russia to keep conflict levels low, when incidents at sea have occurred.
In the following section, our understanding of conflict between states (including 
theories on conflict escalation) are outlined. Then the case itself is described, before 
we embark on a discussion concerned with both the case and the larger idea of con-
flict management at sea.
2. Conflict between states
Conflict is a natural part of society. It describes a situation where two or more 
 actors  hold incompatible goals.19 Despite common usage, the term does not 
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entail outright hostility or war. As described by the SAGE Handbook of Conflict 
 Resolution:  “conflict is normal, ubiquitous, and unavoidable”.20 Galtung, in the 
1960s, conceptualised conflict as a triangle between contradiction (incompatibil-
ity of positions), behaviour (towards the conflict), and attitude (perceptions about 
the   opposing  parties). When all dimensions are present and interacting, conflict 
 occurs.21  ‘International conflict’ is international by virtue of the parties present 
in the conflict, usually states. These conflicts are often marked by issues pertain-
ing to sovereignty, nationhood, identity and security, making them prone to rapid 
 escalation and potentially catastrophic consequences.22 Bercovitch, Kremenyuk, & 
Zartman23 borrows from Mitchell24 and categorises the issues over which states en-
gage in  conflict as “(a) issues of resources, (b) issues of sovereignty, (c) issues of 
survival, (d) issues of honour, and (e) issues of ideology”. Others have highlighted 
the  difference between conflict over material interests and conflict over human needs 
such as security, identity and recognition.25
When conflict occurs, its cycle consists of (1) emergence, (2) escalation, 
(3)  attempts to manage the conflict, and (4) resolution of the conflict itself.26 Emer-
gence of the conflict takes place when an event or an incident brings the incompatible 
interests between actors to the agenda. This might happen through deliberate action 
by actors seeking to gain from the conflict, or by uncoordinated events that highlight 
the conflict of interests.27 When a conflict escalates, it moves from a limited dispute to 
an  incident which can have larger ramifications, as the severity of the conflict grows.28 
We can roughly envision this as a scale, from ‘rhetoric and statements’ to ‘limited 
action and threats’, and finally to ‘destructive actions and outright hostility’.29 Escala-
tion is driven by interaction between the competing parties. As Schelling argues30, the 
point of escalation is to convince your opponent to back down, as the “cost” of fur-
ther escalation is deemed too high. Escalation thus becomes a game of “competitive 
risk taking”.31 This relates to the concept of a ‘crisis’. A crisis is generally understood 
as one stage in a conflict with a limited time-span, which contributes to escalation. 
Holsti describes a crisis consisting of three factors: the issue at hand, the rationale for 
tension, and the relevant actions taken by the actors.32 A crisis is (1) unanticipated, 
(2) perceived as a great threat to the actors involved, (3) perceived as having a limited 
time frame, and (4) perceived as having the potential for disastrous consequences if 
left unmanaged.33
Moving into the cycle stages of conflict management and resolution, there has been 
considerable debate in the literature on where to focus efforts when attempting to 
settle conflict between states. There is a crucial distinction between conflict man-
agement – where the underlying problem is not solved and management options 
are sometimes introduced by third parties – and conflict resolution, which goes to 
the root of the problem at hand. Conflict resolution is consequently “the process 
whereby institutional and policy options are discovered that meet the needs of the 
parties, thus establishing the basis for a resolution of the conflict”.34
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For the purposes of this limited case study we can roughly distinguish between 
 rationalist and ideationalist scholars when discussing conflict escalation, management 
and resolution. Rationalist approaches within international relations place emphasis 
on the goal-seeking rational behaviour of states, driven and constrained by material 
factors as well as institutional structures.35 For some of these scholars, conflict is a 
natural part of international affairs, where states seek to optimise their outcomes 
vis-à-vis each other in the international system. Cooperation (between states) is in-
herently a product of conflicting interests and/or policies, which in turn are brought 
into alignment. Conflict thus provides the platform for potential cooperation. States 
are the relevant actors, as they engage in bargaining and cost-benefit  calculations 
according to fixed preferences in line with the “logic of consequences”.36 Institu-
tions – as tools set-up by states to manage potential disputes – are rational design 
consequences of states’ interests and a result of a bargaining process between the 
same states.37 Scholars thus argue that if the dispute at hand is of material character, 
it should be easier to reach pareto-optimal solutions where each party accepts a ne-
gotiated outcome.38
Alternatively (or additionally), an ideationalist approach takes into consideration 
ideational factors in international politics.39 These include the conceptualisation 
of identity, the role of historical images, and the mutual constitutive and socialis-
ing processes that occur amongst actors operating on an international issue.40 
 Outcomes are thus not only a result of a bargain or negotiation; they are con-
structed, constituted by actors’ interactions. States develop a mutual understand-
ing of what constitutes a ‘fair’ result when managing their ongoing dispute. This 
mutual understanding is essential in determining the scope of possible outcomes 
between the states in question.
One ideational approach that explicitly examines cooperation and conflict is the 
notion of ‘track two diplomacy’. Some contribute the term to the article Foreign Policy 
According to Freud by Davidson and Montville in 1982, which examined  psychological 
dimensions to conflict resolution.41 The authors argued that psychological barriers 
are the main hindrance to dispute settlement, and if removed or  reduced “the con-
tending parties create new possibilities for negotiations”.42
A core concern is how to measure and separate various causal mechanisms, given 
the elusive character of some of the ideational concepts.43 As Johnston points out, 
constructivists have a challenge explaining outcomes where realpolitik offers plausi-
ble arguments. It is not enough that socialisation theory is able to explain instances 
where rationalist theories fall short. It should also be able to prove how actors with 
realist mind-sets are socialised to forgo these conceptions, using cooperation as the 
vehicle or mechanism for this socialisation.44 As Kelman argues: “[t]he hallmark of 
social interaction is that each participant tries to enter into the other's perspective 
and take the other's role, thus gaining an understanding of the other's concerns, 
expectations, and intentions.”45 Kaye also argues that “diplomacy is not just about 
producing negotiated outcomes but also about influencing how others think”.46 
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The starting point of operationalising track two diplomatic processes concerned with 
‘low-level’ cooperation is therefore to lean on the conceptualisations made above 
regarding the formation and constitution of interests. In contrast to rationalist liter-
ature, conflict resolution within this approach is less concerned with conflict “res-
olution”, and more concerned with the “transformation” of the actors involved.47
In sum, conflict is inherent to interaction between states at the international level. 
There are several theories that highlight both what states engage in conflict over, as 
well as how conflicts escalate and, at times, are resolved. Rationalist approaches focus 
on preferences, bargaining and pareto-optimal outcomes. Actors adhere to a “logic 
of consequences”. Ideationalist approaches revolve around the idea that interests 
and outcomes are constituted, not set. Interaction between actors can change the 
interests of the same actors through socialisation and a “logic of appropriateness”.48 
Naturally, this rough separation does not attempt to do justice to the whole range of 
literature concerning conflicts between states and how to approach a study of these. 
There are additional theories with a postmodern outlook that critically examine lan-
guage, power structures, gender, and/or capital, which have not been reviewed here.49 
At the same time, the purpose of this article is not to question or advance current 
theories concerned with conflict. Instead, the aim is to improve our understanding of 
one specific dispute in the Arctic by utilising some of the rough tools provided in the 
review given in this section. Thus, we now turn to the dispute at hand.
3. Dispute Management: The Svalbard Zone
In the post-World War II period, Norway and Russia have been on opposing sides 
with regards to security and military alliances. Norway has hinged its security on 
membership in NATO and its bilateral relationship with the United States, with 
Russia perceived as the primary security challenge.50 For Russia, albeit important 
given the NATO-Russia relationship, Norway constitutes just one out of several 
neighbours where security issues might arise.51 The Barents Sea has been central in 
the relationship between these two countries. It is a maritime domain integral to the 
security of both states, as well as to regional economic development in North Norway 
and North-West Russia respectively.
3.1 The Svalbard Zone
The dispute in focus here concerns the waters around the Svalbard archipelago to 
the north of the Norwegian and Russian mainland.52 Norway was granted sover-
eignty over the archipelago with the Svalbard Treaty, signed in 1920 in Paris, which 
came into effect in 1925. The Treaty gives nationals from the signatory countries the 
right to live and work on the islands, while it places some limitations on Norway’s 
ability to tax and use Svalbard for military purposes.53 The latter restriction compli-
cates the use of military equipment, yet not when the military is performing civil-
ian tasks. The Norwegian Coast Guard makes use of Longyearbyen for bunkering 
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and other civilian purposes. Similarly, although the Norwegian Government has 
restricted the use of Longyearbyen airport to civilian aviation only, military aircraft 
can use it when performing civilian tasks such as search and rescue and oil spill 
response.54
Norway and Russia established their 200-nautical mile EEZs in 1976 and 1977, 
respectively. After establishing its EEZ in the Barents Sea, Norway decided to estab-
lish a FPZ around the Svalbard Archipelago in 1977. Norway argues that the 200-
mile maritime zone around Svalbard is not covered by the Treaty, and thus a regular 
EEZ where Norway has sovereign rights.55 Other countries, however, claim that the 
principles of the Svalbard Treaty should apply to the 200-mile zone, even though 
only territorial waters were explicitly stated when the Treaty was formalised in 1920. 
This reading of the Treaty means that Norway under articles 2 and 3 cannot dis-
criminate between Norwegian nationals and nationals of the other signatories when 
it comes to economic activity in the maritime zone. A third approach is to claim that 
neither the Treaty nor Norwegian rights apply to the zone, in turn deeming the zone 
around the archipelago international waters.56
To avoid an outright challenge to the Norwegian claim, and to protect and manage 
what is the central nursery area for the Northeast Arctic cod stock, the Norwegian 
government established the FPZ in 1977.57 So far the other Treaty signatories have 
accepted this, although Russia and Iceland in particular have been outspokenly criti-
cal of what they perceive of as discrimination toward their fishing vessels by the Nor-
wegian Coast Guard.58 Norway also claims that the Svalbard Treaty does not apply to 
the continental shelf around the archipelago. Norway argues that Svalbard does not 
have a continental shelf in its own right (politically), and that the continental shelf is 
subject to Norwegian sovereign rights.59 Although other countries dispute this as well, 
the scope of the Treaty concerning both the maritime zone and the continental shelf 
has never been tried before an international court. In 2006, Norway submitted its 
extended continental shelf claims in accordance with UNCLOS, and the Commis-
sion on the Limits of the Continental Shelf gave its final recommendations in 2009.60 
The Commission found that Norway’s continental shelf in relation to Svalbard ex-
tends beyond 200 nautical miles, yet did not discuss whether or not the Treaty holds 
relevance for the shelf areas around Svalbard. In 2015, the Norwegian Government 
launched the 23rd licensing round for oil and gas exploration and production, which 
included some blocks in what could be Svalbard’s continental shelf. Russia delivered 
a diplomatic protest, and so far, no activity has commenced in these blocks.61
3.2 Establishing Cooperation
In the 1970s, cooperation between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea developed 
pragmatically in response to the establishment of the EEZs and the subsequent 
disputes that arose. An agreement between Norway and the USSR on fisheries in 
the Barents Sea was completed in 1975, and the first Joint Fisheries Commission 
between the two countries convened in 1976. The Commission’s role is to ensure 
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sustainable management and exploitation based on scientific advice of the four 
stocks that are considered common in the Barents Sea, namely North-East Arc-
tic cod, haddock, capelin, and Greenland halibut.62 This has become the primary 
mechanism to solve – or at a minimum manage – disputes concerning fisheries in 
the Barents Sea.
Similarly, as petroleum exploration in the Barents Sea expanded and the Cold 
War ended, Russia and Norway agreed on an oil spill agreement in 1994. It included 
developing joint contingency plans and procedures for notification in the event of an 
oil spill.63 It is reckoned that oil spills will drift eastwards due to the currents in the 
Barents Sea, and an oil spill in the Norwegian part is therefore likely to end up on the 
Russian shoreline. Joint exercises have been conducted between the two countries, 
where the crossing of borders by personnel constitute a core element.64 Similarly, 
search and rescue cooperation was initially based on an agreement from 1956, which 
was renewed in 1988 and 1995.65 As with oil spill prevention and response, bilateral 
cooperation entails sharing of information and mechanisms for support in the case 
of a request from the other country.
Another area of bilateral cooperation that has developed with the growth of 
 maritime traffic has been the exchange of information between the various vessel 
traffic services. In 2006, Norway and Russia agreed on strengthening maritime safety 
measures. Based on this, Vardø VTS (Vessel Traffic System) and its Russian counter-
part in Murmansk signed an agreement on mutual sharing of information concerning 
high risk traffic venturing between Murmansk and along the North Norwegian coast, 
implemented in 2013.66 Information on high risk vessels passing through or proceed-
ing to and from ports and anchorages within the Barents area are shared through a 
joint traffic management information system.67 Similarly, a Norwegian-Russian sys-
tem named Barents SRS (Ship Reporting System) was implemented in 2013. It re-
quires high risk vessels to register when sailing in waters stretching from Lofoten in 
North Norway to Murmansk in Russia.68
Practical cooperation between Norway’s and Russia’s coast guards started in the 
early 1990s.69 After the Soviet Union dissolved, fishing vessels started overexploiting 
the Barents cod stock and in 1992 the Joint Fisheries Commission expanded their 
mandate to include control measures. Routines for sharing information on catches 
were subsequently established.70 By 2000, cooperation had further developed and a 
Memorandum of Understanding outlining a number of cooperative measures was 
signed between the countries and their coast guards.71 An additional – and substan-
tial – part of the coast guard cooperation involves the mutual exchange of fisheries 
inspectors and operational personnel. Central to this cooperation is that coast guard 
personnel meet with their Russian or Norwegian counterparts to learn procedures, 
exchange experiences and establish personal relations.
In sum, these various measures of relatively in-depth cooperation have 
 derived from the need to jointly manage fish stocks in the Barents Sea to the 
 benefit of both Norway and Russia. Maritime cooperation has expanded to deal 
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with a growing number of challenges: initially the increase in unregulated fisher-
ies and subsequently a wide range of tasks relating to search and rescue, oil spill 
prevention and response, and management of marine resources. The Joint Fisher-
ies Commission in particular is a central tool for managing fisheries between the 
two countries, often described as the backbone of bilateral cooperation in the 
Barents Sea.72
3.3 Crises and Escalation
Albeit well managed, there have been incidents in the Barents Sea that have had the 
potential to escalate and take on the characteristics of a ‘crisis’. Tensions between 
Norway and Russia have arisen in connection with Norwegian arrests of Russian ves-
sels in the FPZ, and the potential escalation that can occur from a fisheries incident 
to a state-state incident. It is customary that Russian fishing vessels inspected by the 
Norwegian Coast Guard in the FPZ refuse to sign the inspection documents as a 
gesture to highlight Russia’s refusal to recognize Norwegian authority in the Zone – 
although they allow the Norwegian Coast Guard to perform inspections of the ves-
sels.73 The Russian Coast Guard has, on occasion, suggested that Norway and Russia 
conduct joint fisheries inspections in the FPZ around Svalbard.74 Such cooperation 
would, however, challenge Norwegian sovereignty and authority in the FPZ, and the 
Norwegian Government has declined all such proposals.75
Up until the turn of the millennium, Norwegian enforcement of fisheries regula-
tion in the FPZ was relatively constrained compared to the Norwegian EEZ.76 In the 
late 1990s, however, scientists reported that fish stocks were in decline and quotas 
had to be reduced to achieve sustainable fisheries.77 Calculations show that in the 
period 2002-2005 alone, Russian fishing vessels exceeded their quotas in the Bar-
ents Sea by around 100 000 tons annually.78 At the same time, the Norwegian Coast 
Guard Act (Kystvaktloven) was passed in 1997, with an increased focus on compe-
tence enabling measures in the Coast Guard.79 From around 2000 onwards, there 
was a shift in enforcement policy in the FPZ. Increased competence in the Coast 
Guard in combination with growing concerns over the state of the fish stocks, led to 
stricter enforcement of the regulatory regime.80
The first arrest of a Russian fishing vessel that marked a more stringent enforce-
ment regime came in 1998, with the attempted arrest of the Novokuybyshevsk. Parts 
of the Barents Sea were closed for fisheries in 1998 due to concerns over unsustain-
able fishing, and the vessel was found to be in violation of several regulations.81 As the 
Novokuybyshevsk was towed by the Norwegian Coast Guard towards Tromsø, there 
were reports of a Russian Navy vessel leaving the Kola Peninsula headed west, and 
Russian airplanes were seen passing over the Norwegian Coast Guard vessel. These 
actions were interpreted as reactions to the Norwegian arrest; the first of its kind in 
the FPZ. In the end, the issue was resolved through diplomacy and the vessel was 
released before reaching Tromsø after instructions from the Norwegian government 
in dialogue with its Russian counterparts.82
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Three years after the Novokuybyshevsk incident, in 2001, the Russian vessel 
Chernigov was arrested. As with the Novokuybyshevsk, Russian naval activity on 
the Kola Peninsula was registered, although there was no confrontation at sea.83 
The   arrest of Chernigov – the first Russian vessel from the FPZ to be brought all 
the way to Tromsø – led to diplomatic protests from Russia, as well as the presence 
of a Russian Navy vessel – Severomorsk – in the FPZ the following year, presumably 
to  inspect and safeguard Russian fishing vessels. As Åtland and Bruusgaard write: 
“[t]his rare Russian show of force was apparently meant to send a signal to political 
decisionmakers in Norway”.84 In the three years that followed (2002-2004), no ar-
rests of Russian vessels took place in the FPZ.
In 2005, however, Norwegian fisheries inspectors from the Coast Guard boarded 
the Russian vessel Elektron, after it had been under surveillance for some time. After 
severe infringements were uncovered, the trawler was arrested and escorted towards 
Tromsø for the Norwegian Police to continue with the prosecution. The captain 
of Elektron, in agreement with its Russian owners, had other plans and decided to 
flee with the two Norwegian fisheries inspectors on-board.85 From October 16 until 
 October 19, four Norwegian Coast Guard vessels, as well as a maritime surveillance 
aircraft and several helicopters, closely tailed the trawler as it headed for Russian 
 waters. The Norwegian Government considered using military force to halt the vessel 
by boarding it. In the end, bad weather was blamed for not following through with 
the boarding.86 It is also highly likely that Norwegian authorities were concerned with 
the escalation effects such actions could have vis-à-vis Russia.87
The Elektron-incident was widely publicised, with coverage on Norwegian national 
television. Fermann and Inderberg argue that this was a part of a conscious strategy 
by the Norwegian authorities to gain sympathy for its policies and ensure public 
support.88 If we refer to the definitions previously laid forward concerning crises and 
conflict cycles, it seems apparent that this affair had all the characteristics of a crisis. 
The incident was unanticipated (1), perceived as a great threat to the actors involved 
(2), within a limited timeframe (3), and had the potential to cause serious damage in 
the relations between Norway and Russia (4). It is significant that this incident did 
not only concern fisheries management, it also took part in the larger context of the 
disputed regime concerning Svalbard’s maritime zone and attempts by Norway to 
establish a clear legal precedent in the same area.
On October 20, the two fisheries inspectors were released to the Norwegian Coast 
Guard by the Russian Border Service (its coast guard), which had arrived to escort 
Elektron to Murmansk after “intense dialogue” between the Russian and Norwegian 
governments.89 Russian reactions to the initial arrest were less severe than in 2001, as 
dialogue was chosen ahead of protests. The incident has subsequently become seen 
an example of a small-scale dispute managed well by both Norway and Russia. As 
described by former Norwegian Coast Guard Chief Skram, the fact that Norway was 
considered an “OK” neighbour in Russia, in tandem with the recognition that there 
needs to be a rule-based regime concerning fisheries in the Barents Sea, helped the 
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two countries manage this particular crisis.90 At the same time, the incident led to 
questions being asked about the division between civilian and military tasks in the 
Norwegian Coast Guard, as well as how best to manage such volatile incidents in the 
future.91 After Elektron, the Norwegian Coast Guard attempted to develop new ways 
of settling fines at sea instead of having to bring fishing vessels all the way to Tromsø; 
a journey that entails considerable costs to the owners of the vessels.92
In 2010, Norway and Russia reached agreement on the maritime boundary 
 dispute in the Barents Sea93. However, actors in Russia were claiming that the 
deal was too favourable to Norway.94 There was also fear that Russian fishermen 
could potentially be excluded from waters they had access to in the Norwegian 
EEZ, if Norway at one point decided to halt cooperation on quotas. Echoing these 
fears, as the maritime boundary was implemented in 2011, there was an increase 
in the number of arrests of Russian fishing vessels in the FPZ. In an untimely turn 
of events, the Norwegian Fisheries Minister had announced the same year that 
Norway would not tolerate the practice of discarding fish, an issue that was receiv-
ing increased attention in Norway as well as in the EU with its reform of the EU 
Common Fisheries Policy.95 Discards were a growing problem in the Barents Sea 
fisheries.96
The arrests of Russian fishing vessels that year – five in total – peaked in another 
crisis on September 28, 2011, as the Norwegian Coast Guard attempted to arrest 
the Russian trawler Sapphire II in the FPZ. The captain resisted the arrest and kept 
in dialogue with a Russian state vessel, which was nearby. Eventually Sapphire II was 
towed to Tromsø and charged, albeit with the Russian state vessel tailing until they 
reached the Norwegian EEZ.97 In the Russian media, there were strong  reactions 
against what was described as aggressive and discriminatory behaviour by the Nor-
wegian Coast Guard toward Russian vessels.98 Russia also delivered a protest to the 
Norwegian Embassy in Moscow. This in turn influenced the Joint Fisheries Com-
mission in 2011 and 2012, hampering negotiations on quotas and access. In the 
end, however, the two countries reached agreement on procedures for enforcing the 
ban on discarding fish, and worked on more harmonised guidelines for inspecting 
fisheries.99 Since Sapphire II, there have been no similar arrests made of Russian 
fishing vessels in the FPZ. At the same time, the practice of settling arrests at sea has 
increased.
In March 2014, Russia annexed Crimea, and relations between Norway and 
 Russia became strained as Norway followed the EU and the United States sanction-
ing Russia over its actions in Ukraine. In terms of consequences for disputes in the 
FPZ, it is hard to pinpoint exact effects. As the Norwegian Coast Guard highlights, 
the larger international dispute has not had any direct effect on Norway-Russia 
cooperation concerning coast guard affairs in the Barents Sea.100 At the same time, 
there has been an increased amount of attention given to the potential for conflict in 
the  Barents Sea.101 Both countries deem this to be a region of significance, as high-
lighted by a report by the Russian Defence Ministry in 2017 listing Svalbard and its 
Managing Conflict at Sea
111
maritime zone as potential areas for confrontation between Russia and NATO.102 
 Following that report, a controversial Norwegian blog concerned with defence – 
aldrimer.no – reported that Russia had simulated an invasion of Svalbard during 
its military  exercise Zapad in 2017.103 Albeit not surprising given Russian mili-
tary strategies in the north,104 this was refuted by both the Norwegian Minister of 
 Defence and the Head of the Norwegian Military Intelligence Service.105 Whether 
or not it was  accurate, it sparked a brief debate amongst Norwegian politicians and 
defence analysts, and highlights the underlying fear that Svalbard might become 
an arena for conflict with Russia. Hence, we could speculate that there have been 
efforts made on both the Norwegian and Russian side to avoid confrontation over 
the FPZ from 2014 onwards, given the larger security concerns that such a dispute 
would entail.
In sum, the FPZ around Svalbard has been the domain in which several small-scale 
incidents have occurred between Norway and Russia, or more accurately, between 
the Norwegian Coast Guard and Russian fishing vessels. None of these incidents 
have spiralled out of control, although some have taken on a state-to-state dimen-
sion, as Russian authorities reacted to Norwegian actions. Yet, both countries have 
managed to avoid further escalation and solved the issue at hand. The question then 
is why? What are the factors underpinning this relative stability?
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4. Conflict Management in the FPZ
First, we can attempt to pinpoint to what extent conflict situations in waters 
around Svalbard have escalated beyond only political statements. A more stringent 
 enforcement of regulations in the FPZ was pursued from 1998 onwards. Russia re-
sponded to arrests by the Norwegian Coast Guard with diplomatic protests and a 
show of military force. In some instances, the arrest of a single trawler also spilled 
over into the Joint Fisheries Commission and hampered cooperation. It seems, given 
the two countries’ willingness to use force (or the threat of the use of force), that the 
incidents on their own have had the potential to escalate from a win-win situation to 
a situation where one or both parties stand to lose.
Specifically concerning Chernigov in 2001, Elektron in 2005, and Sapphire II in 
2011, the arrests themselves and the larger issue concerning Norwegian rights in 
the FPZ, escalated to the extent that threats were implicitly stated through military 
actions, while certain actors were outspokenly critical of the other party. At least, 
this was the case amongst Russian fishermen and their related shipowners, as well as 
amongst former fisheries officials and regional representatives in Murmansk.107 At 
the national level, however, statements from both Norway and Russia have been con-
strained. Despite Russian complaints against Norwegian actions in the FPZ, these 
have not escalated beyond rhetoric and statements. Therefore, although fluctuating 
as arrests have occurred, the overarching conflict over the maritime zone around 
Svalbard has not escalated, making it manageable for both the Russian and the Nor-
wegian governments.
Asking why this is the case, however, is a harder nut to crack. If we return to the 
 initial conceptions of why and how states engage in and resolve conflict, we can iden-
tify some key factors underpinning the relatively stable relationship between Norway 
and Russia. First, rationalist ideas of power, coercion and interests help frame the 
FPZ in the larger context between these two states and their regional and global 
positions. Norway’s membership in NATO and outspoken policy of ensuring US 
support in case of sovereignty threats,108 come into play. Yet, deterrence does not help 
explain how and why Norway and Russia continue to establish new forms of low-level 
cooperation in the Barents Sea, and how the two countries solve incidents when they 
do occur. We therefore must move from the systemic level to the immediate issues at 
hand between the two actors.
According to rationalist logic, cooperation can be the product of discord. In other 
words, states cooperate when they disagree. Sometimes formalisation and  institutions 
are needed to overcome the self-help tendencies of the international system. Along 
this line of argumentation, cooperation between Norway and Russia concerning 
shared fish stocks, oil spill response, search and rescue, and ship traffic management 
are formalised arrangements set up to manage potential areas of discord. Along the 
same line of argumentation, the Barents Sea maritime boundary agreement in 2010 
was a result of interests between the two states converging sufficiently.109
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In other words, the reason why Norway and Russia manage to keep crises from 
escalating further, is mutual interest in preserving aspects of their cooperation; 
 cooperation that benefits both parties. This relates to multiple issue areas. Concern-
ing resource management, Russia is assumed to be satisfied with the current quota 
scheme, in contrast to what might be achieved if an actual debate over the status 
of the FPZ took place.110 Concerning the UNCLOS-regime, both parties benefit 
from a stable legal regime in the FPZ specifically, but also in the Arctic at large.111 
And concerning national security, both parties have an interest in low levels of 
 conflict for fear of coercive efforts by other actors within and outside the Barents/
Arctic region.112
The interests that drive cooperation might, however, be subject to change 
(over  time). We can see changes taking place within all the issue-areas addressed: 
as climate change continues to alter the marine resource base in the Barents Sea; 
as external actors challenge the validity of the UNCLOS-regime in the Arctic; or as 
the power relations between various actors fluctuate. The institutions set up to man-
age cooperation are also challenged and questions of institutional resilience become 
 salient: how will cooperative mechanisms adapt as conditions influencing the premise 
for cooperation change?113
For example, as Norway and Russia struggled to reach agreement on a reduc-
tion of annual quotas for the Barents Sea in the early 2000s, several institutional 
measures were taken. In 2002, a harvest control rule was introduced in the Joint 
Fisheries Commission to set quotas according to scientific advice while also limit-
ing fluctuations from year to year. This has been described as the most important 
change in the work of the Commission, removing a source of friction between the 
two states (which had spill-over effects into the FPZ).114 Another adaptation (or 
innovation) was the development of a port state control regime amongst the North 
East Atlantic coastal states, which improved information concerning quotas and 
port deliveries, removing accusations of overfishing and unreliable information.115 
Similarly, the measures taken in 2012 to harmonise rules for inspections of fishing 
vessels that were taken after the Sapphire II incident removed another source of fric-
tion in the FPZ.116
The rationalist approach to dispute management in the international domain pro-
vides a functional answer: institutions are set-up for a purpose and will (must) adapt 
as conditions for their existence alter. The reason why Norway and Russia have man-
aged to avoid further escalation of potential crisis in the FPZ – without settling the 
overarching dispute concerning the status of the maritime zone – is because their 
interests are sufficiently aligned within several related domains and issue areas. If 
interests remain converged, and/or institutions like the Joint Fisheries Commission 
can enable convergence through negotiations, incidents are unlikely to escalate into 
actions that can threaten the larger bilateral relationship.
This does not, however, capture the whole proverbial elephant. As emphasised 
by officials in the Norwegian Coast Guard117, former Coast Guard officers,118 and 
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multiple scholarly works written on the management of shared fish stocks in the Bar-
ents Sea,119 the individual level constitute a core element of conflict management in 
the Barents Sea. This concerns ideational factors, meaning the influence and impor-
tance of ideas and social interactions, on top of what we can observe through interest 
alignment and rational bargaining theory.120
In the Svalbard Zone, some key elements stand out. The importance of dialogue 
during a crisis is given much of the credit for solving incidents between the Norwe-
gian Coast Guard and Russian fishing vessels. This includes communication between 
the Coast Guard and Russian trawlers (including the use of Russian interpreters); 
between the Norwegian Joint Military Headquarters and the Chief of the Russian 
Northern Fleet at Severomorsk; and between the negotiating groups in the Joint 
Fisheries Commission.121 Having various means of communicating, and keeping 
channels open as a crisis is unfolding, constitute central elements in the manage-
ment of conflict in the FPZ.122 This can be linked to the notion of ‘track two diplo-
macy’, albeit without an immediate large-scale international crisis as an impetus. 
Still,  instilling so called low-level or ‘soft’ dialogue in addition to other more formal 
channels of communication, have – in this case – provided an effective approach to 
conflict management.123
This concerns the larger concept of personal relations, as social contact between 
two or more individuals representing different sides in a dispute. The theory of so-
cialisation emphasises not only the communication component, but also the fact that 
a change occurs between the parties. Norms (expected behaviour) socialise (change) 
actors according to a logic of appropriateness.124 By interacting regularly with the 
same individuals on the same issues (fisheries, quotas, inspections) over time, mutual 
understanding emerges as the individuals themselves better comprehend the position 
of the other party. As the Norwegian Coast Guard puts it:
“When we cooperate with Russian officials, Russian fishermen subsequently learn about our 
rules and procedures. This lowers the chance of serious violations at sea. Moreover, we learn 
about the Russian approach to the same issues. This helps harmonise rules and regulation 
across the two countries.”125
In turn, compromise is reached. As Hønneland and Jørgensen describe the 
 “culture of cooperation” in the Barents Sea: “[a] common feature in these cases 
[fisheries  cooperation] is that the parties met exactly in the middle”.126 Crucially, 
this ‘middle’ is not given, it is constructed through dialogue and communication.127
Moreover, personal relations have formed the basis for the institutionalisation 
of some of these mechanisms. This concerns the exchange of coast guard officers 
from  Norway and Russia, as well as the formalised sharing of information and 
 annual meetings between the Chiefs of the coast guards. This institutionalisation 
and its relevance for the issues at hand in the Barents Sea at large, and the FPZ 
specifically, played a central part in sheltering the coast guard cooperation from 
sanctions and restrictions put in place between Norway and Russia in 2014.128 
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There is thus a feedback loop taking place between institutionalisation and personal 
interactions.
This article does not attempt to outline a monocausal explanation for success in 
maritime dispute management. Instead, the aim is to showcase how multiple expla-
nations emphasising different aspects of conflict relations contribute to the outcome. 
In sum, several factors concerning the dispute in the Svalbard Zone help explain why 
it has been managed adequately in the context of a larger quarrel.
5. Conclusion: conditions for success?
This article has only examined one case that includes multiple incidents. Still, some 
relevant conditions have become apparent, particularly in the incidents concerning 
the Russian vessels Chernigov, Elektron and Sapphire II. Vasquez and Valeriano de-
scribe a conflict as spiralling when it is infused with symbolic qualities.129 Initially, 
one would imagine that maritime disputes – whether concerned with fishing rights 
or boundaries – would be a simple matter of delineating rights and ownership, given 
the tangible character of such disputes. Yet, it seems apparent that as soon as a mari-
time dispute reaches the political agenda, there are actors who benefit from infusing 
it with intangible dimensions such as ‘national pride’ and ‘being cheated from what 
is ours’.130
Officials in Murmansk and representatives from the fisheries industry have 
 attempted to frame the dispute in the larger security relations between Norway and 
Russia, arguing that Russia is weak and does not protect its rights (compared to 
times under the USSR).131 As Åtland and Bruusgaard show132, these attempts at “se-
curitisation” were not successful in spurring the Russian government into escalating 
actions. Yet, they highlight how maritime disputes are not devoid of the intangible 
and symbolic elements that can lead to conflicts escalating beyond the dispute at 
hand. Albeit outside the scope of this article, it is worth noting that similar attempts 
to politicise or even securitise maritime disputes were perhaps more successful during 
the Cod and Turbot Wars, or more recently in the South China Sea. This shows how 
maritime disputes are not devoid of the intangible and symbolic elements that can 
lead to conflicts escalating beyond the initial matter at hand.
Maritime disputes are on the one hand more elusive, or at least less place-bound, 
than conflicts on land, given the characteristics of the maritime domain. On the 
other hand, disputes can take on some of the same intangible characteristics as 
disputes on land. Despite initially being more concerned with tangible questions 
of resource delimitation and ‘who owns what’, disputes at sea can still be subject 
to the escalating dynamics of disputes more generally.133 It is within this space that 
dialogue and communication, and possibly socialisation, stand out. As this case 
has highlighted, the ongoing dispute between Norway and Russia in the Arctic 
has been managed primarily by communicating with the counterpart. At the same 
time, behind the amicable relations between coast guard and military officials on 
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both sides looms the larger security relationship that both states are engaged in, and 
their numerous reasons to avoid escalating tensions both bilaterally and regionally.
This in turn can also be explained by the rationale driving much of the expansion 
in cooperation between Norway and Russia, namely the inherent win-win opportu-
nities for states at sea. These come from the nature of tasks concerned with emer-
gency preparedness and response, as there are limited capabilities and resources 
present in this vast maritime domain. Cooperation on assistance in the case of an 
emergency is relatively simple, spurred by the characteristics of the maritime. An-
other area of win-win opportunities lies in marine resource management. Primar-
ily fisheries, but also transboundary oil and gas deposits, have strong cooperative 
elements where it is relatively easy to recognise the need for collaboration across 
international boundaries.
We must separate between low-level disputes taking place in a maritime domain – 
such as those between Russian trawlers and Norwegian authorities – and larger 
so-called ‘high level’ conflicts involving a threat to the state itself. As this case study 
has highlighted, it has been possible for Norway and Russia to distinguish between 
these levels. Yet, there is no law of nature that keeps these levels separate, and small-s-
cale disputes do undoubtedly run the risk of escalating beyond their limited realm. 
Understanding what underpins stable relations is thus central, and the next step 
would be to flip this study and examine Russian perceptions and approaches to the 
same dispute.
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